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Ventures Involving Taxable and Tax Exempt Entities
DARRYLL

K. JONES*

I. OVERVIEW

Joint ventures involving taxable and tax-exempt organizations, referred
to in this article as "taxable-tax exempt joint ventures," engender conflict
between the doctrinal requirements pertaining to tax exemption and the
flexibility afforded joint ventures in Subchapter K.' The nonprofit partner
must exercise ultimate governing control over the joint venture so that
charitable goals take precedence over profit-seeking goals if the nonprofit's
share of income is to remain tax exempt. On the other hand, a for-profit
partner is entitled and indeed expected to pursue profit but its lack of control
over the joint venture exposes the for-profit partner to greater risk of loss than
it would confront in other investments. In essence, a for-profit partner in a
taxable-tax exempt partnership must assume the role of a limited partner. The
nonprofit partner must act as exclusive general partner. In normal partnerships, 2 a limited partner would demand certain risk avoidance or compensation
concessions-special allocations, guaranteed payments, and preferred returns
-in recognition of the higher risk arising from its lack of control. Those risk
avoidance and compensation methods usually have two primary effects. First,
they elevate one partner's return potential over those of another. Second, they

* Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. LL.M
(Tax) 1994, University of Florida. The author is a member of the Journal of Business Entities' Partnership
Tax Editorial Board. He is also faculty editor for the University of Pittsburgh Tax Review with primary
responsibility for partnership tax and tax exempt organization.
I. Subchapter K means I.R.C. §§ 701-761 (2004).
2. For purposes of this article, the phrase "normal partnership" means any joint venture that does
not have a tax exempt partner.
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indemnify one partner, to a certain extent, at the expense of another.3 These
effects seem inherently inconsistent with the control mandate, and yet it is
unreasonable to think that for-profit partners will participate in taxable-tax
exempt joint ventures without insisting on risk avoidance and compensation.
This article analyzes the degree to which a taxable-tax exempt partnership or
limited liability company can make use of risk avoidance and compensation
methods available in Subchapter K without running afoul of doctrinal
requirements for tax exemption. The article concludes that the policies
underlying tax exemption should prevail over the policies embodied in
Subchapter K, but that the Subchapter K policies should nevertheless apply
to the extent they are not inconsistent with tax exemption.
II. THE CONTROL MANDATE
Revenue Ruling 2004-5 1 appears to have finally lain to rest the broad
theoretical question of whether and by what terms charitable organizations
may form partnerships5 with profit-making entities without forfeiting federal
tax exemption.6 Partnerships involving taxable and tax exempt entities have
been discussed and debated for nearly 25 years, beginning most prominently
with PlumsteadTheatreSociety, Inc. v. Commissioner7 in 1980 and continuing
through the 1990's and into the new millennium with General Counsel

3. In this article, I will assume that all joint ventures have only two partners or members.
4. Rev. Rul. 2004-51,2004-22 I.R.B. 974. Revenue Ruling 2004-51 involves an exempt university
that forms an LLC with a for-profit entity to provide distance learning via interactive video. Id. The
operating agreement allows each partner to appoint three members of the governing board but gives the
university exclusive control over the educational content of the video classes. Id. The ruling concludes that
the university's exempt status is not affected by the joint venture because the activities constitute an
insubstantial part of the university's activities. Id. The ruling further states that the LLC's activities will
not generate unrelated business income because (]) the university has exclusive control over the educational
content, (2) all contracts entered into by the LLC are at arms length and for fair market value, (3) allocations
and distributions are proportional to each partner's ownership interest, (4) the video courses cover the same
content as the university's traditional classes, and (6) the video courses increase access to the university's
educational programs. Id.
5. The term "partnership" refers to any joint venture that is taxed as a partnership and therefore
includes limited liability companies that do not elect to be taxed as an association. See Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-3(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2003).
6. It may seem strange that the issue would have consumed nearly twenty five years of intellectual
energy given that tax law long ago confirmed that charities do not necessarily forfeit tax exemption when
they join together with profit-makers using the corporate form. But there are significant theoretical
distinctions between profit making using the corporate form and profit-making via a partnership because
a corporation is taxed at the corporate level, while partnerships are not.
7. 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Memoranda 39005' and 39862, 9 Revenue Ruling 98-15,"° Redlands Surgical
12
Services v. Commissioner," St. David'sHealth CareSystem v. United States,
and finally Revenue Ruling 2004-51.13 These seven cases and rulings
("opinions") are briefly synthesized in Section III in order to provide context
to the later discussion in Section IV regarding the interaction between partnership tax law and charitable tax exemption. Together, the opinions articulate
an explicit mandate that charities may form partnerships with profit-makers
without wholly or partially 14 jeopardizing tax exemption only if the partnership agreement gives ultimate control over the partnership to the charitable
partner. The best indicators of the required control is the right to appoint a
majority of the partnership's governing body, and the articulation of preeminent, legally enforceable charitable goals in the partnership agreement.
The mandate was first thoroughly articulated in Revenue Ruling 98-15, but
that ruling applied to the more drastic, "whole charity joint ventures,"' 5 where-6
by a charity's entire existence and operation is merged into a partnership.'
It does not address the less drastic "ancillary joint ventures," by which a
charity conducts a smaller part of its operations through a partnership but most
of its operations independently. 7 Stakeholders were left wondering whether
the same mandate of ultimate control applied in latter instances. Revenue
Ruling 2004-51 answers that question in the affirmative, though unlike whole
charity joint ventures, primafacie control can be demonstrated in ancillary
joint ventures even if the charity does not have the right to appoint a majority
of the governing board.'"

8. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983).
9. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
10. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
I1. 113 T.C. 47 (1999), affid, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
12. 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003).
13. Rev. Rul. 04-51, 2004-22 I.R.B. 974.
14. The imposition of the unrelated business income tax (UBIT) is a partial withdrawal of tax
exemption. See generally I.R.C. § 511 (2004).
15. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
16. The term, "whole hospital joint ventures", is commonly used because joint ventures and most
of the relevant rulings were provoked by changes in the health care industry. See Darryll K. Jones, Private
Benefit and the Unanswered Questions From Redlands, 89 TAX NOTES 121, 122 n.9 (2000) (discussing
the difference between "whole charity" and "ancillary" joint ventures).
17. Id.
18. Rev. Rul. 04-51,2004-22 I.R.B. 974. Revenue Ruling 2004-51, relating to ancillary joint ventures, adopts the reasoning set forth in an American Bar Association proposal submitted to the Service in
August 2002. See ABA Sends IRS Proposed Revenue Ruling on Ancillary Joint Ventures, available at
LEXIS, 2002 TNT 190-14. ("[T]he only tax risk posed by ancillary joint ventures is that the distributive
share ofjoint venture income may be subject to the unrelated business income tax", and "voting control is
not as important in ancillary joint ventures as it is in [whole charity] joint ventures"). I have previously
argued, and still assert, that an ancillary joint venture that conveys a private benefit can and should result
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Stakeholders have never been happy with the control mandate. They
argue, for example, that it is unrealistic to expect a for-profit partner to give
control over its profit-making operations to a partner whose goal is something
other than profit-making. 9 If that objection is accurate,2 ° the control mandate
excludes charities from collaborative sources of income that would otherwise
be available for good works. Still, the control mandate has survived at least
two appellate challenges 2' so there is no reason to think it will be discarded
even for pragmatic imperatives such as the need to fund more charity. 22 Stakeholders who are nevertheless dependent upon the benefits that can be obtained
only by virtue of a joint venture will simply have to cope with their unhappiness. The one apparent consolation is that the opinions also acknowledge that
profit-making via taxable-tax exempt partnerships is not prohibited. That is,
the opinions do not suggest that a for-profit partner must be as charitable as
the nonprofit partner, nor would it make sense to think so.
Control is necessary, though not absolutely, for the pursuit of profit. One
should therefore expect that a profit-making partner would consider the lack

in the revocation of tax exemption. Darryll K. Jones, Private Benefit and The Unanswered Questionsfrom
Redlands, 89 TAx NOTES 121, 136-38 (2000). Others assert that the private benefit doctrine is unnecessary, if not irrelevant, and that the worst consequence to a charity whose ancillary joint venture is inconsistent with tax exemption should be that only the income therefrom be taxed. See John D. Colombo, A
FrameworkforAnalyzing Exemption and UBIT Effects of Joint Ventures, 34 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 187
(2001).
19. See, e.g., Todd R. Greenwalt, Revenue Ruling 98-15: A CriticalView, TAX NOTES TODAY, May
21, 1998, available at LEXIS, 98 TNT 98-67 (stating inter alia that profit-making hospitals would never
subject itself to the control of an unrelated party); Carolyn D. Wright, Exempt ControlNot Absolutely
Necessary in Joint Ventures, Kindell Says, TAx NOTES TODAY, October 31, 2000, available at LEXIS,
2000 TNT 211-2 (citing one practitioner as asserting that no for-profit will enter into a joint venture with
a nonprofit that insists on retaining control).
20. The reason why the objection may be inaccurate in more than a few instances is that many
activities that justify tax exemption can also be quite profitable. A religious publishing house or a famous
boys' choir, for example, can generate significant profits whether organized as profit making or charitable.
See, e.g., Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1324, 1332 (5th Cir. 2003).
[T]he line between commercial enterprises which produce and present theatrical
performances and nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations that do the same is not always easy
to draw. Indeed, the theatre is the most prominent area of the performing arts in which
commercial enterprises coexist, often in the same city, with nonprofit, tax-exempt charitable
organizations that also sponsor professional presentations.
Id.
21. In both cases, the nonprofit argued that formal control, as manifested by the right to appoint a
majority of the governing board, was not absolutely necessary as long as the partnership provided sufficient
charitable benefits to the public. See St. David's Health Care System v. United States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th
Cir. 2003); Redlands Surgical Services v. Comm'r, I 13 T.C. 47 (1999), affd, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
22. Section 502 of the Internal Revenue Code essentially rejects the notion that the pursuit of income
by commercial activities deserves tax exemption so long as the funds are devoted to charitable purposes.
See I.R.C. § 502 (2000).
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of control a factor that increases its risk of loss. Agency theory, for example,
holds that risk correlates positively with reliance on agents. If risk is too
great, the for-profit partner should decline the opportunity to form a partnership. Theoretically, this should be the case in many taxable-tax exempt
partnerships because the gist of the control mandate from a for-profit partner's
perspective is that it must rely on the charitable partner to conduct its
operations and profit must be subordinated to charity. 23 If a well-advised forprofit partner considers the risk significant but not prohibitive, it might enter
into the partnership under circumstances that nevertheless decrease the risk
arising from its lack of control. Actually, there is nothing unusual about such
an approach. In normal partnerships, one or more partners will make concessions allowed by Subchapter K as compensation for another partner's agreement to accept greater risk. Thus, a partnership agreement might authorize
disproportionate (i.e., "special") allocations,24 consistent with the partners'
relative economic positions and risk of loss. A partnership agreement might
also call for guaranteed payments 2 or preferred returns26 to compensate a
partner whose risk is greater than others, or to induce a partner to forego other

23. While there are many activities that may be profitably conducted by a tax-exempt entity, see
Plumstead Theatre Soc'y, Inc., 74 T.C. at 1332, there are many more others that are unlikely to earn a
profit. A drug and alcohol counseling center that serves inner city residents is one example. A single room
occupancy (SRO) hotel is another.
24. In this article, I will use the phrase "special allocations" to refer to allocations of income, gain,
loss, or deductions that differ by percentage from a partner's percentage of total partnership capital. See
Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special Allocations,46 TAX L. REV. 1,2 (1990) (providing that
a system without special allocations is one in which allocations are made in accordance with the relative
interest in partnership capital as determined by capital accounts); see also JEROLD A. FRIEDLAND,
UNDERSTANDING PARTNERSHIP AND LLC TAXATION § 6.04 at 229 (2nd ed. 2003) ("'[Slpecial allocations
generally refers to an allocation of a partnership or LLC item that is disproportionate to the partners' or
members' capital contributions or to their ratio for sharing other partnership or LLC items.").
25. A "guaranteed payment" is essentially an amount payable to a partner even if the partnership
has no net earnings. See I.R.C. § 707(c) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c) (as amended in 1983).
26. A preferred return is a form of special allocation and distribution defined in the tax regulations
as "a preferential distribution of partnership cash flow to a partner with respect to capital contributed to the
partnership by the partner that will be matched, to the extent available, by an allocation of income or gain."
Treas. Reg. § 1.707-4(a)(2) (as amended in 1992). One writer describes a preferred return with guaranteed
payment characteristics:
Partnership preferred equity is increasingly common. In order to mimic the payoffs of
corporate preferred stock, such partnership equity is typically entitled to a preferential return
each year payable only out of partnership net income. To the extent there are insufficient
partnership profits to pay the preferred return in a given year, the shortfall is carried forward
(typically on a compounded basis) and is payable in subsequent years on a preferential basis
to the extent there is sufficient partnership income in those years. Finally, upon liquidation,
the preferred equity is typically entitled to receive its accrued but unpaid return and
liquidation value prior to the partnership common equity receiving any liquidating proceeds.
Lewis R. Steinberg, Fun and Games with GuaranteedPayments, 57 TAX LAw. 533, 563 (2004).
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investment options. Any one of these methods, and more," is available under
Subchapter K as tools to compensate a partner for increased risk.
The opinions by which the control mandate is imposed are generally,
though not completely silent on whether the flexibility of Subchapter K
applies in all its convoluted glory once the mandate is met. In both revenue
rulings, for example, the Internal Revenue Service, (the "Service"), specifically notes, as one factor supporting the legitimacy of the joint venture vis-Avis the charitable partner, that allocations and distributions to the partners are
proportional to each partner's capital contribution.2" The rulings do not say
exactly what effect special allocations and distributions would have, though
it is significant that the rulings suggest that special allocations and distributions are inconsistent with tax exemption. 29 The judicial opinions might also
be interpreted as assuming, if only implicitly and certainly without actually
deciding, that allocations and distributions in taxable-tax exempt partnerships
must always be proportional to capital contributions.30 These observations

27. A partnership agreement might also obligate one or more partners to contribute more capital at
some point via a provision known as a "capital call." One partner could be obligated to indemnify another
for unexpected losses.
28. Revenue Ruling 98-15, for example, states only that:
A [the charity] and B [the for-profit] form a limited liability company, C. A contributes all
of its operating assets, including its hospital to C. B also contributes assets to C. In return,
A and B receive ownership interests in C proportional and equal in value to their respective
contributions.
Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
Revenue Ruling 2004-51 is more explicit, stating:
M [the charity] and 0 [the for-profit] each hold a 50 percent ownership interest in L, [an
LLC] which is proportionate to the value of their respective capital contributions to L. The
governing documents provide that all returns of capital, allocations and distributions shall
be made in proportion to the members' respective ownership interests.
Rev. Rul. 04-51, 04-22 I.R.B. 974.
29. My research has found at least two instances where it is asserted that special allocations in
taxable-tax exempt partnerships are at least potentially inconsistent with tax exemption. See Rochelle
Korman & Dahlia Balsam, Joint Ventures With For-ProfitsAfter Revenue Ruling 98-15, 27 EXEMPT ORG.
TAX REv. 441, 443 (2000) (citing Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,732 (May 27, 1988) (for the proposition that
special allocations may cause the charitable partner to lose tax exemption); see also Michael I. Sanders, Hot
Issues Affecting Partnershipsand Joint Ventures Involving Partnerships,TAX NOTES TODAY, April 20,
1998, available at LEXIS, 98 TNT 75-50 (stating that special allocations may be inconsistent with tax
exemption, but citing no authority). The authorities cited in both instances do not seem to support the
proposition.
30. In St. David's Health Care Sys. v. United States, the charity's allegation that all allocations and
distributions were proportional to capital contributions went unchallenged and was not an issue because
the case was decided on the control issue. See Brief for Appellee at 13, St. David's Health Care Sys. v.
United States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003). The partnership agreement in Redlands Surgical Serv. v.
Commissioner, indicated that the charity was to contribute 27% of the capital yet be allocated 46% of
partnership items. Record at Exhibit 17-Q, pg. 5-6, Redlands SurgicalServ., 113 T.C. at 47 (Agreement
of General Partnership of Redlands Ambulatory Surgery Center). According to the Court, however,
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raise the question whether there is something about charitable tax exemption
that should preclude taxable-tax exempt partnerships from access to the same
sort of tax flexibility Subchapter K affords to other partnerships.
An obvious concern is that Subchapter K flexibility allows shifting of
income and therefore tax avoidance for for-profit partners. The special status
afforded charities, however, suggests that charities should not assist in illegitimate tax avoidance, even if the tax avoidance is otherwise available to normal
partnerships. The problem is that even intentional tax avoidance under
Subchapter K has been specifically condoned by Congress and therefore can
hardly be deemed "illegitimate.",3' As a general matter, Congress knowingly
tolerates a certain amount of tax avoidance under Subchapter K. The presence
of a tax exempt partner increases the opportunity for tax avoidance because
income can always be allocated to that partner to decrease one partner's tax
liability without increasing any other partner's tax liability. Nevertheless, the
tax avoidance made possible by an exempt partner is qualitatively identical to
the avoidance specifically condoned by Congress. The question is whether
charitable partners should be held to a special, higher standard of conduct with
regard to their participation in joint ventures.
A second, less obvious concern is the extent to which the for-profit
partner's economic goals necessarily preclude or interfere with the charitable
goal by virtue of the risk avoidance or compensation arrangements available
under Subchapter K. If earnings from a joint venture must be preferentially
channeled to the for-profit partner, the effect might be the same as would
occur if the for-profit partner actually controlled the venture. Earnings and
profits that would otherwise be used to expand charitable services, according
to the charitable partner's desires, might instead be subject to the for-profit's
preferential rights. Of course, whenever a charity interacts with for-profits in
a commercial setting, the charity and society must expect that the for-profit
intends to be enriched by the interaction. It would be illogical to assume that
private profit is to be completely prohibited because charities exist within a
broader marketplace that is entirely profit-driven.
Section mII shows that the joint venture rulings uniformly, and quite
correctly, assume that for-profit partners seek profit, not charity, from taxabletax exempt joint ventures. The rulings implicitly assume that a for-profit

Redlands actually contributed 37% of the capital and was to be allocated 46 percent of partnership items.
See Redlands Surgical Serv., 113 T.C. at 50. In its proposed denial letter to Redlands Surgical Services
denying tax exemption, the Service alleged, as one basis for the denial, that allocations lacked substantial
economic effect. See id. at 70. That allegation was not decided by the Ninth Circuit. In any event, the case
involved special allocations but neither the Tax Court nor the Ninth Circuit needed to address the issue
because the case was decided on the control issue. See generally id.
31. See generally Gergen, supra note 24, at 4, 8 (noting that special allocations allow for income
and character shifting).
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partner's expectation of reasonable return is legitimate. Section IV summarizes some of the risk avoidance and compensation methods that partners frequently use to protect their profit expectation and the Subchapter K restrictions that apply to those methods. Section V compares three affirmative legal
obligations imposed on charities-the prohibition against private inurement,
the prohibition against private benefit, and the public policy doctrine-to the
risk compensation methods available under Subchapter K. The goal is to
determine whether those risk compensation methods are incompatible with tax
exemption. The article concludes that reasonable private gain should not be
prohibited, unless the law intends to preclude taxable-tax exempt joint ventures altogether. The risk compensation methods under Subchapter K should
therefore be available to taxable-tax exempt partnerships to the extent those
methods would be legitimate in the normal marketplace. As noted earlier, the
relevant cases and rulings suggest that Subchapter K risk avoidance and
compensation methods should be conclusively denied to taxable-tax exempt
partnerships. This article explores some of the possible justifications for that
suggestion. Section V acknowledges that in particular instances special
allocations and preferential distributions undermine the control mandate and
should be prohibited, but only as necessary to ensure the charitable goal
remains preeminent. This should not require a blanket prohibition but rather
a case by case analysis, just as is applied to normal partnerships though for
different purposes.
Im. THE FOR-PROFIT'S REASONABLY EXPECTED RETURN
Other writers have thoroughly described the doctrinal evolution of
taxable-tax exempt partnerships.32 Those descriptions have quite appropriately focused on what the nonprofit partner should expect and demand from
the partnership if the nonprofit is to remain tax exempt. This section recounts
that history from a different standpoint. It looks at what the for-profit partner
in taxable-tax exempt joint ventures can reasonably expect and legitimately
obtain from the joint venture without jeopardizing the nonprofit's tax exemption. The goal is to identify any concessions within the cases and rulings to
the axiomatic notion that a for-profit partner is entitled to pursue reasonable
profit via its participation in the partnership.

32. See, e.g., Janet James Mahon, Joint Ventures Between Non-Profit and For-Profit Organization;
St. David's Case - Worthy Destination, But Road Under Construction, 56 TAX LAW. 845 (2003); Phil
Royalty & Donna Steel Flynn, Not- For- Profit/For- Profit Joint Ventures: A White Paper, 25 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 37 (1999). I realize the phrase "taxable-tax exempt partnership" may be somewhat
oxymoronic. Readers should interpret it to mean a partnership with one or more tax exempt organizations
and one or more taxable entities.
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The Service held an absolutist view of taxable-tax exempt partnerships
prior to the Tax Court's opinion in Plumstead Theatre Society Inc. v.
Commissioner.33 That view arose from the doctrinal observation that partners
owe one another the highest fiduciary duty. 34 A general partner owes a particularly high duty of fidelity to limited partners since limited partners are even
more dependent on a general partner than are other general partners. The
logical, yet entirely unimaginative conclusion was that a nonprofit general
partner would be required to subordinate its own charitable impulses in favor
of its taxable partners' pursuit of profit.35 Hence, a nonprofit organization
could not possibly serve as a general partner in a taxable-tax exempt partnership while still maintaining a tax exemption granted in exchange for an
explicit promise to pursue charity rather than profit.36 It followed from this
reasoning that the mere existence of a taxable-tax exempt partnership justified
the revocation of the charitable partner's tax exemption.
Plumstead 7 represents not only a specific repudiation of the foregoing
logic, but also an implicit recognition that charity and profit-making need not
be mutually exclusive. Although the opinion only briefly addresses taxabletax exempt partnerships, 3 it clearly implies that a for-profit organization can
legitimately expect to pursue reasonable profit in its dealings with a tax
exempt organization. In hindsight, one can only wonder why this simple

33. 74 T.C. 1324 (1980).
34. See generally id.
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the
duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928).
35. In the early seventies, the Service adhered to the view that:
By agreeing to serve as the general partner of the proposed housing project, [a tax exempt]
Corporation would take on an obligation to further the private financial interests of the
limited partners. Since the promotion of those private interests would tend to foster
operating and maintenance practices favoring the equity holdings of the limited partners to
a greater extent than would otherwise be justifiable on the basis of reasonable financial
solvency, the Corporation's assumption of a duty to promote such interests in its capacity
as general partner would necessarily create a conflict of interest that is legally incompatible
with its being operated exclusively for charitable purposes.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,293 (May 30, 1975).
36. See generally I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). "Evidently the exemption is made in recognition of
the benefit which the public derives from corporate activities of the class named, and is intended to aid
them when not conducted for private gain." Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924).
37. 74 T.C. 1324 (1980).
38. The court's discussion of taxable-tax exempt joint ventures is confined to a single paragraph on
the last page of the opinion. Plumstead TheatreSoc'y, Inc., 74 T.C. at 1333-34. Nevertheless, the very
brief discussion laid the foundation for nearly 25 years of debate and analysis. See generally id.
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theoretical axiom was so painfully derived. Nonprofit organizations exist
within the context of capitalism and therefore must enrich profit seekers with
whom they necessarily interact to achieve charitable goals. 39 The easiest
of reasonable compensation to employees or
example involves the payment
40
independent contractors.
Plumsteadinvolved a nonprofit theatre society's efforts to produce a play
under tight budget constraints. The society formed a limited partnership with
two individuals and a for-profit corporation in an effort to raise needed
capital. 4' The Service offered the mere existence of the partnership as proof
positive that the society was pursuing profit rather than charity.42 The Tax
Court rejected that notion. In effect, the Court went beyond the blackletter
logic regarding fiduciary obligations.43 The Court noted that the contractual
arrangement between the partners was an arm's length transaction supported
by reasonable consideration and that the nonprofit partner was not immunizing
the for-profit partner against its entrepreneurial risk of loss. Additionally, the
Court noted that the for-profit partners had "no control over the way [the
nonprofit] operates or manages its affairs[.]" 44 In a footnote, the Court stated
that because thejoint venture involved only one of many activities undertaken
by the nonprofit, the worst that could occur from a tax standpoint had the joint
venture not been properly structured is that the earnings from the joint venture
would be subject to the unrelated business income tax.45
Plumstead rested on the implicit assumption that nonprofits must
necessarily convey profit as participants, even if charitable, in the marketplace. Reciting the fact that arms length bargaining resulted in the parties paying reasonable consideration is at least an implicit acknowledgement that the
for-profit will and should obtain a reasonable [i.e., market]' return from its
participation in the partnership. Likewise, the Court's citation to the lack of
any obligation that the nonprofit indemnify the for-profit partner against
entrepreneurial risk implies that the nonprofit's assets should not be used to

39. See Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989) (referring to "secondary benefits"
that invariably flow to private profit-seekers when charities pursue their charitable goals).
40. See generally BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 436 (7th ed.

1998) (discussing charitable organization's right to pay reasonable compensation). The point is relevant
only to the observation that exempt organizations usually must pay at least market rate for goods and
services.
41. See Plumstead Theatre Soc'y, Inc., 74 T.C. at 1328.
42, Id. at 1333-34.
43. See supra notes 33-34.
44. Plumstead Theatre Soc'y, Inc., 74 T.C. at 1334.
45. Id. at 1334 n.8.
46. See also Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2002) (stating, in essence, that
reasonable compensation is determined by reference to what the recipient could obtain from the
marketplace).
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convey more than a reasonable return to the for-profit partner. That is, the
return to the for-profit should be no more than what the market would have
made available given the risks inherent to the joint venture activity. Capitalist
marketplaces do not normally protect an investor from the risk of losing her
investment and neither should a nonprofit's tax exempt assets be made
available for such purposes. Together, the Plumsteadfactors mandate that a
for-profit partner in a taxable-tax exempt partnership should get no more or
less than a market rate of return-the same rate of return that a charitable
organization would be required to pay for goods or services provided outside
the context of a joint venture.
The Plumstead factor most directly related to the nonprofit partner's
obligation to pursue charity is the requirement that the for-profit have no
control over the nonprofit's operations. This factor is relevant to the partnership's overall purpose-that is, whether the nonprofit is operating for a charitable purpose. It does not necessarily preclude a for-profit partner's pursuit of
profit since, as noted above, charity and profit need not be mutually exclusive.
Control over the venture, then, is a necessary precondition for the exemption
of income from a joint venture but it does not preclude the private gain the
for-profit partner naturally and necessarily expects.
Plumstead'simplications regarding a for-profit partner's pursuit of reasonable profit have been rather thoroughly confirmed by subsequent administrative rulings (both formal and informal) and cases. In a 1983 memorandum,
the Treasury Department's General Counsel stated that a taxable-tax exempt
partnership did not jeopardize the nonprofit partner's tax exemption so long
as the partnership arrangement allowed the nonprofit general partner to pursue
charity rather than profit.4 7 It is most significant for present purposes that the
limited partners involved in the memorandum were entitled to preferential
cash distributions on their contributed capital.4" In a subsequent ruling, the
General Counsel objected to a joint venture in part on the grounds that the
profit-seeking partner's return was potentially much greater than that available
under commercially reasonable terms.49 Revenue Ruling 98-15, the Service's
most authoritative pronouncement on Plumstead's view of control, quite
explicitly accepts the proposition that the for-profit partner is entitled to earn
a profit. The ruling describes two similar fact situations. In the first, the nonprofit partner thoroughly controlled the resulting partnership. In the second,

47. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983). General Counsel Memoranda (GCM's) are prepared
by the IRS General Counsel. Although made available to the public in redacted form for informational
purposes (most accessibly via LEXIS and WESTLAW), GCM's have no precedential authority.
48. Id.
49. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
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the for-profit partner is granted ultimate control.5" The first situation is said
to demonstrate a taxable-tax exempt partnership that does not cause a revocation of the nonprofit's tax exemption. The second is said to demonstrate a
partnership that does cause the revocation of the nonprofit's tax exemption.
Significantly, in both situations the for-profit's participation is motivated by
and contingent upon a "reasonable rate of return."'" That the contingency was
included in both situations suggests that a taxable entity's pursuit of profit via
its participation is rather unremarkable. Indeed, the matter-of-fact manner in
which the contingency was stated and then ignored through the rest of the
ruling indicates that the for-profit's receipt of a reasonable profit via a partnership with a tax exempt entity is entirely appropriate and to be expected.
The major joint venture cases decided since Plumsteadlikewise confirm
the proposition that a for-profit partner may legitimately pursue profit from a
taxable-tax exempt partnership. Redlands Surgical Services, for example,
begins the analysis by stating that a for-profit partner's receipt of "returns on
their capital investment" is insufficient by itself to jeopardize the nonprofit
partner's tax exemption.5" Indeed, the opinion acknowledges and accepts the
economic inevitability that for-profit partners must be compensated for their
participation.53 The opinion cites the undue competitive advantages obtained
by the for-profit partner as an important indication that the partnership caused
the revocation of the nonprofit's tax exemption. The partnership agreement
in Redlands contained a non-compete clause that prevented the nonprofit from
providing independent services elsewhere in the relevant community.54 The
Tax Court reasoned that this factor would eventually allow the for-profit to
operate within the community "with significantly reduced competitive pressures."5 5 The economically oriented language suggests that the for-profit was
allowed to use the nonprofit's tax exemption to obtain a return greater than

50. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718. In Situation 1, the operating agreement also explicitly stated
that the LLC must be operated in a charitable manner. Id. The LLC entered into a management agreement
with a management corporation unrelated to either members. Id. In Situation 2, the operating agreement
did not make the pursuit of charity the preeminent goal and the management company was a for-profit
subsidiary of the for-profit member. Id.
51. Id.
52. 113 T.C. at 74-75 (citing Plumstead for the proposition that "[tihe mere fact that an
organization seeking exemption enters into a partnership agreement with private parties that receive returns
on their capital investment does not establish that the organization has impermissibly conferred private.
benefit. The question remains whether the organization has a substantial nonexempt purpose whereby it
serves private interests.").
53. Id. at 77 ("[Flor the activity is indivisible, and no discrete part of the Operating Partnership's
income-producing activities is severable from those activities that produce income to be applied to the
[taxable] partners' profit.").
54. Id. at 52-53.
55. Id. at 92.
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would normally have been afforded in the marketplace and, as a result, the
partnership jeopardized the nonprofit's tax exempt status. The opinion in St.
David'sHealth CareSystem used similar economic language in describing the
unobjectionable features of a taxable-tax exempt partnership that nevertheless
caused the revocation of a nonprofit's partner's tax exemption because of a
lack of control. 6 The case notes, without apparent concern, that the for-profit
partner sought the partnership with the
nonprofit as a convenient method by
57
which to expand into a new market.
It may be that this section has devoted too much thought to what really
ought to be an obvious point. Profit-making by way of charitable activities,
however, is sufficiently alarming to some that the point needs to be reiterated.
Often a charity's invariable participation in the broader capitalist marketplace
causes stakeholders to question whether tax exemption is appropriate even
though the charity is merely complying with general economic laws applicable
to all participants and which require the rendition of a fair price for goods and
services. Good intentions do not make a charity immune from the marketplace
and amoral economic rules are no less applicable between partners. Thus, as
the cases and rulings demonstrate, alarm is only appropriately sounded when
charitable organizations lend themselves to returns greater than that available
to a profit seeker in the normal marketplace. If tax theory condones taxabletax exempt partnerships, it must also expect and condone that a for-profit
partner will receive a market return in exchange for its participation.
IV. RISK COMPENSATION AND TAx AVOIDANCE IN PARTNERSHIPS
In a whole charity joint venture, "control" means that the nonprofit must
control the entire partnership if the nonprofit wants to maintain tax exemption. 8 Control must be demonstrated on a prospective basis by provisions in
the partnership agreement giving the nonprofit voting control over the joint
venture's governing body and making the pursuit of charity the venture's
exclusive and preeminent goal. Actual charitable operations will be insufficient to prove a primafacie case for exemption in the absence of prospective
provisions in the partnership agreement.5 9 The control requirement applies as

56. 349 F.3d at 239.
57. Id.
58. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718. Although Revenue Ruling 98-15 recites several indicia of
control (voting control and a provision in the partnership agreement requiring that charitable goals take
precedence over profit-seeking goals), it seems clear that voting control on the partnership's governing body
is the most important factor. See St. David's Health Care Sys., 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003) (reversing
summary judgment relating to a joint venture that clearly engaged in charitable activities for the foremost
reason that the nonprofit did not control the governing body).
59. See generally Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 47, and St. David's Health Care

Sys. v. United States, 349 F.3d 232, which leave open the theoretical possibility that control might be
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well in ancillary joint ventures, though control apparently need not be demonstrated on a prospective basis.6" Control in ancillary joint ventures can be
proven by the manner in which the venture is conducted. In either circumstance, a for-profit partner's lack of control in a taxable-tax exempt joint
venture increases the partner's risk of loss.
In normal partnerships, one or more partners may insist upon and be
granted concessions related to the undertaking of relatively greater risks. 61 A
limited partner, for example, may be entitled to current or cumulative preferred returns. A partner whose capital contribution is qualitatively or quantitatively greater than other partners may be specially allocated items of loss or
deduction related to her capital contribution and a partner with specialized
knowledge but little capital might be granted a guaranteed payment during the
partnership's start-up period. 62 This section briefly describes the tax

demonstrated by actual operations, and also clearly suggest that the failure to establish control on
prospective basis will doom the partnership regardless of the amount of charity actually achieved.
60. Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-22 I.R.B. 1. The nonprofit partner in Revenue Ruling 2004-51 did not
have voting control of the governing body but did control the LLC's substantive operations. Id. The ruling
lends itself to the argument that if the nonprofit organization lacked substantive control, the income from
the ancillary joint venture would be taxed as unrelated business income even if the joint venture's actual
activities turned out to be both charitable and substantially related to the nonprofit's charitable goals. This
would be inconsistent with I.R.C. § 512(c)(1) (2004) which indicates that the income from a partnership
is taxable to a nonprofit partner only if the trade or business is actually unrelated. The control criterion is
manifestly a prospective standard in the sense that a lack of control suggests that a nonprofit partner is not
organized so that it will operate in accordance with charitable goals in the future. This may be logical with
regard to whole charity joint ventures but illogical with regard to ancillary joint ventures since, by
definition, the majority of the nonprofit's activities are conducted independently of the joint venture. On
the other hand, if the nonprofit does not control the ancillary joint venture it also cannot logically be
presumed that the partnership's activities will always be related to the nonprofit's charitable goals. Because
the organizational requirement is not applicable to the determination of whether UJBIT applies, as it is with
regard to maintenance of tax exemption, it seems most logical that the lack of control should not
automatically result in UBIT. Compare I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2004) (specifically requiring that a nonprofit
be "organized" as well as "operated" in a manner to achieve charitable goals) with I.R.C. §§ 511-513
(2004) (together imposing UBIT if a trade or business is unrelated with no mention of an organizational
requirement).
61. Gergen, supra note 24, at 2 (1990) (stating that partnership allocations allow partners to
apportion risk to suit their preferences).
62. The differing economic considerations that influence a partnership agreement are succinctly
stated in one of the leading casebooks:
Through their partnership agreement, partners have considerable latitude to structure
allocations of profits and losses (both generally and as to specific income and expense
items), the amount and timing of distributions of cash or property, and the compensation
paid to partners who render services to the enterprise. The partnership agreement can
provide priority returns to partners on their invested capital or for services, and it can specify
how much each partner is entitled to receive on a liquidation of the firm.... With or without the intrusion of an income tax, a manager partner ordinarily will demand some form of
base compensation for her efforts, while the investors may seek a preferred return on their
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restrictions, such as they are, on the use of those risk compensation devices.
It concludes that the devices are useful and appropriate to legitimately
compensate partners for their relative risks. Those same devices, however,
lend themselves quite readily to tax avoidance or the undermining of the
charitable partner's required control of thejoint venture. Section V addresses
whether the risk compensation methods allowed to partners under Subchapter
K are inconsistent with the theory of tax exemption, and whether the
opportunities for tax avoidance are so great that the risk compensation
methods available under Subchapter K should be precluded to taxable-tax
exempt partnerships.
A capital-poor partner who places her entire livelihood in the hands of
others would be best advised to seek a stable and predictable cash flow from
those others. For example, if a service partner forsakes her long held career
to pursue her fortune with other like-minded but capital-rich partners, she
might nevertheless have recurring expenses that cannot be deferred. Such is
often the case with service partners in a "money and brains"63 partnership.
The approach is also predictable for a capital-rich partner who commits much
of her stored capital to a new partnership. That partner may be capital rich but
have low present cash flow and therefore be dependent, now or in the future,
on the income that would otherwise be obtained from the capital committed
to the partnership. Finally, an investor might have other investment options
none of which are inherently more risky than that offered by the partnership.
Prospective partners would therefore be compelled to offer the same fixed rate
of return to the investor that she could get from the marketplace. The investor
would be better off investing in the partnership because in addition to the
fixed rate of return, she would be entitled as a bona fide partner to share in the
"borrower's" profit. Thus, any capital poor, low cash flow, or option rich
partner should seek a fixed and periodic return-a guaranteed payment-as
compensation for the peculiar risk caused by its legal inability to control the
use of her investment. 6'

invested capital and an allocation mechanism that provides for a recovery of their investment before profits are shared with the manager partners. If and when the enterprise
becomes profitable, the managers usually will insist upon a priority allocation of a stated
percentage of net profits.., with the remaining profits to be shared among all partners in
proportion to their capital investments.
STEPHEN A. LIND, STEPHEN SCHWARz,DANIEL J. LATHROPE, & JOSHUA D. ROSENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS
OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 112 (5th ed. 1998).
63. Id. Professors Lind, et. al., describes a "money and brains" partnership as one in which "investor
partners contribute cash and other forms of capital, and manager partners contribute their expertise and
entrepreneurial skills." Id.
64. Thus, a "guaranteed payment" can be used to insulate a partner against a risk of loss. Gergen,
supra note 24, at 13.
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Preferred returns are another risk compensation technique. As with guaranteed payments, preferred returns might also be used to induce an investor
to forego other investment options. Preferred returns give one or more
partners the right to be paid an aggregate amount of partnership profits prior
to a distribution to other "common" partners.65 Usually payment is conditioned on whether the partnership actually earns a profit during the accounting
period. Thus, preferred returns do not eliminate as much risk as a guaranteed
payment, though the distribution preference decreases the amount of time the
"preferred" partner's initial investment is subject to risk of loss.
In other situations, partners may structure allocations to accommodate
one partner's greater need or preference for present income. Income will
therefore be disproportionately allocated to that partner while the need or
preference continues, followed by a change to the allocation scheme (a "flipflop") in later years after the partner has received a certain amount. A flipflop could be used to provide preferential capital recovery (typically referred
to as "payout") to one partner.6 6 Flip-flop allocations are more commonly

used, however, to accomplish a proportional recovery of capital to each
partner.67 It might also be the case that one partner asserts and is granted a
greater entitlement to deductions from property she contributed.68 This will

65. See supra note 20.
66. For example, a partnership agreement might allocate all profits and losses to one partner until
payout, followed by a proportional allocation scheme thereafter.
67. A typical flip-flop is actually more fundamentally correct than any other allocation, at least
during the period prior to the change in allocation percentage. For example, a typical flip-flop allocates
profits and losses in accordance with each partner's percentage of capital contributed to the partnership
until each partner has been allocated an amount equal to her capital contribution. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §
1.704-1(b)(5), Example 16 (as amended in 2004). Thereafter, profits and losses are allocated equally. This
seems fundamentally correct because during the years prior to payout-i.e., recovery of initial capital, one
partner bears a greater risk of loss (as measured by initial capital contribution) than another and should be
allocated (and distributed) partnership items consistent with that greater risk. Once "payout"-defined as
recovery of initial capital-is achieved, the partners bear equal risk and items should be allocated equally.
Id. See also Hamilton v. United States, 687 F.2d 408 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (approving of a flip-flop allocation
consistent with the typical flip-flop described above).
68. The Joint Committee on taxation has described, with apparent approval, a use of flip-flops to
prioritize capital recovery:
[l]n a typical flip-flop, often a large proportion of a newly formed partnership's initial losses
and deductions (perhaps 99 percent) flow through to partners with high taxable incomes
who can use the tax benefits. This allocation arrangement frequently remains in effect until
these partners have recouped their initial investments, and perhaps some additional return,
whereupon the allocation shifts so that losses (which are much smaller after the initial years)
and profits and distributions (which may have increased if the partnership's business has
obtained a firm footing) are allocated in greater proportion to the partners who are taxexempt, or in a low tax bracket. This type of flip-flop can serve the purpose of giving
investors an initial high-ratio writeoff, while keeping a substantial profits interest for the taxexempt partner.
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necessarily result in disproportionate loss allocations though it is possible that
aggregate losses allocated to each partner may turn out equal.69
Partners may also seek special allocations for obvious tax avoidance purposes. It is not uncommon, for example, that a partnership agreement will
contain a "chargeback" provision in conjunction with a prior special allocation
of depreciation deductions solely or predominantly to one partner. A
chargeback requires that gain from the sale of depreciated property, in an
amount equal to prior depreciation deductions, be allocated to the partner to
whom the depreciation deductions were specially allocated.7" The overall
result will be that the partner subject to the chargeback will have deferred a
portion of her tax liability for the number of years between the first special
allocation of depreciation and the year of the chargeback.7" Finally, gains and
losses of a certain character (ordinary or capital) can be allocated to intentionally decrease their aggregate tax liabilities, such as when one partner is tax
exempt and another has taxable income from sources unrelated to the partnership.72 Tax planning, of course, is always legitimate; the incessant problem
is distinguishing legitimate tax planning from illegitimate tax avoidance.
Subchapter K recognizes and generously accommodates the economic
interests identified above. I.R.C. § 707(c), for example, defines a guaranteed
payment as any partnership payment for a partner's services or the use of her
capital, if the payment is determined without regard to partnership income.73
Regulations explain how to account for guaranteed payments but they do not
otherwise impose any explicit restriction on their use. Economically, a
guaranteed payment is a potentially deductible transfer of capital from one
partner to another. In effect, the paying partner places her capital at higher
risk than the recipient partner's capital. As such, a guaranteed payment can

Joint Committee on Taxation, TAX TREATMENT OF MASTER LtMrrED PARTNERSHIPS at 37 (JCS-I 8-87),
June 29, 1987.
69. If losses turn out equal to each partner notwithstanding the special allocation, the special
allocation will probably violate the substantial economic effect requirement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.7041(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 2004). The substantial economic effect rules are explained in detail below. See
infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
70. See Gergen, supra note 24, at 16 (describing, by way of example, a chargeback of the first $100
of net partnership income to offset a prior special allocation of $100 loss).
71. For example, if a two person, start-up partnership has losses during its initial four years of $100
and gain in subsequent four years of $100, an allocation of all losses during the first four years to A,
followed by an allocation of all gains in the subsequent years to A to the extent of prior allocated losses
(equally thereafter), will result in the deferral of $50 for the first four years. See id. If gains in subsequent
years are at least equal to prior losses, the allocations will have no affect other than to reduce aggregate tax
liabilities.
72. If the partner to whom the losses are allocated is subject to a gain chargeback in later years, the
allocations may have no affect other than to reduce taxes.
73. I.R.C. § 707(c) (2004).
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be used to indemnify one partner against the partnership's entrepreneurial
risks to the extent of the payment.74 If what is labeled a preferred return is
eventually payable in all events,75 it should instead be treated under I.R.C.
§ 707(c) as a guaranteed payment since the payment is fixed and is conditional
only with respect to time of payment. Tax limitations on guaranteed payments
and preferred returns are only implicitly stated. Partnerships will normally
avoid unreasonably large guaranteed payments not because of any restriction
in Subchapter K, but because the deductibility by the non-recipient partners
is conditioned on the payment being viewed as reasonable under I.R.C.
§ 162.76 The reasonable requirement is never actually imposed as an absolute
matter in Subchapter K, though it makes sense that I.R.C. § 162 would apply
if a guaranteed payment is to be treated as though it were being made to an
unrelated third party for goods or services.77
Preferred returns sometimes require special allocations and thereby
trigger the detailed rules that govern special allocations. In a two person,
equal partnership, for example, a partner who receives a preferred return will
necessarily receive a disproportionate allocation of income if the partnership's
total net income is less than twice the amount of the preferred return. If a 50%
partner is entitled to the first $100 of distributable cash, and the partnership
earns only $150, the preferred partner will receive two-thirds and the common
partner one-third of the income. The special allocation will serve as a means
to appropriately tax the preferred partner on her disproportionate share of

74. Guaranteed payments may be amortized over a certain period of time and thereby allow for a
partner's gradual recovery of capital.
75. See Steinberg, supra note 26, at 563.
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1 (c) (as amended in 1983) ("For a guaranteed payment to be a partnership
deduction, it must meet the same tests under section 162(a) as it would if the payment had been to a person
who is not a member of the partnership, and the rules of section 263 (relating to capital expenditure) must
be taken into account."). Thus, an unreasonable guaranteed payment would logically be viewed as a
disguised distribution of earnings. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1) (as amended in 1958)
Any amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in fact as the purchase price of
services is not deductible. An ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a distribution
of a dividend on stock. This is likely to occur in the case of a corporation having few
shareholders, practically all of whom draw salaries. If in such a case the salaries are in
excess of those ordinarily paid for similar services and the excessive payments correspond
or bear a close relationship to the stockholdings of the officers or employees, it would seem
likely that the salaries are not paid wholly for services rendered, but that the excessive
payments are a distribution of earnings upon the stock.
Id.
77. For example, if guaranteed payments are "reasonable," they will not be considered as evidence
of a disguised sale which would trigger immediate recognition under I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(A) (2004). Treas.
Reg. § 1.707-4 (as amended in 1992). Likewise, reasonable guaranteed payments and preferred returns are
excluded in determining whether UBIT applies to nonprofit partners in debt-financed real estate
partnerships. Treas. Reg. § 1.514(c)-2(d) (as amended in 2003).
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distributed income. I.R.C. § 704(b) attempts to regulate special allocations so
that those dictated by the economic bargain between partners are respected
while those adopted solely for tax avoidance are disregarded. The essential
mandate is that special allocations must have a real, after tax consequence to
one or more partners. 78 Greatly simplified, if the effect of a special allocation
is merely to reduce the taxes of one or more partners without affecting present
or future economic results to any partner, the allocation will be presumed to
have been made solely for tax avoidance rather than in pursuit of the partners'
economic bargain.79 Students of Subchapter K will quickly recognize that the
word "may" is justified by the various presumptions in the I.R.C. § 704
regulations that permit obvious tax avoidance allocations solely to avoid
prohibiting allocations that have legitimate economic motivations, though they
result in tax reduction.8 °

78. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a) (as amended in 2004). For purposes of space and readability,
I endeavor in the text to relate only the essence of the partnership tax provisions related to my thesis without
articulating too little information. In the following footnotes, I set forth or paraphrase the very detailed
provisions in Subchapter K related to my thesis. Readers familiar with Subchapter K may safely skip those
footnotes if they so choose. Readers unfamiliar with Subchapter K can follow the text's reasoning without
knowing the details, but may wish to study the footnotes as well.
79. Id. The precise requirement is articulated as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph (b)(2)(iii), the economic effect of an allocation (or allocations) is substantial if there is a reasonable possibility that the allocation (or
allocations) will affect substantially the dollar amounts to be received by the partners from
the partnership, independent of tax consequences. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence,
the economic effect of an allocation (or allocations) is not substantial if, at the time the
allocation becomes part of the partnership agreement, (1)the after-tax economic consequences of at least one partner may, in present value terms, be enhanced compared to such
consequences if the allocation (or allocations) were not contained in the partnership agreement, and (2) there is a strong likelihood that the after-tax economic consequences of no
partner will, in present value terms, be substantially diminished compared to such consequences if the allocation (or allocations) were not contained in the partnership agreement.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b)(2)(iii)(a) (as amended in 2004) (emphasis added).
80. Note that the substantial economic effect test relies on the existence a "strong likelihood" at the
time an allocation is placed into a partnership agreement for its effectiveness. That is, it must be reasonably
predictable beforehand that an allocation will only not substantially diminish the relative value of any
partner's partnership interest compared to the value without the special allocation if it is to be presumed
that the allocation is made for tax avoidance purposes. Id. Three presumptions apply in determining
whether there is in fact a strong likelihood that an allocation is made for tax avoidance. First, if a special
allocation in one year does not alter the relative value of any partner's partnership interest from what it
would have been without the special allocation, the "strong likelihood will be presumed retroactively and
the special allocation will be presumed made for tax avoidance reasons. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)
(b)(2) (as amended in 2004) (referring to a "shifting allocation"). Second, if the effect of a special allocation is not entirely offset by subsequent allocations made within five years, the "strong likelihood" will be
presumed absent and both the original and offsetting allocations will not be presumed made for tax
avoidance purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(c)(2) (as amended in 2004) (relating to "transitory"
allocations). The third presumption is that the sale of depreciable property will result in neither gain nor
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A simple example proves the point and eliminates the need for detailed
further discussion of the I.R.C. § 704(b) rules (except in the footnotes). A two
member LLC, taxed as a partnership, may have $100,000 and a depreciable
building (assume a five year recovery period for simplicity) with an adjusted
basis of $100,000. If member A has sufficient outside losses so that her tax
liability is zero in each of the next five years, she may agree that all depreciation deductions should be allocated to member B who has no such outside
losses. If the LLC agreement also requires that all gain from the later sale of
the asset is to be charged back (i.e., allocated) to A to the extent of prior
depreciation deductions, and it is a safe reality that the building will not
depreciate to the extent of the depreciation deductions, the net effect will be
that A will defer taxes but neither partner's economic result will differ from
what they would have been in the absence of the special allocation. Although
the special allocations seem clearly tax motivated, they are nevertheless permitted under Subchapter K.8" The special allocation might simply be made in
recognition that one partner contributed the wasting asset while the other contributed cash 82 rather than being made for an explicit tax avoidance purpose.
The question for the next section is whether there are any doctrinal or
policy matters that preclude taxable-tax exempt partners from utilizing the risk
avoidance and compensation methods used in normal partnerships. Certainly
there is greater risk, as an economic matter, to a for-profit partner in a taxabletax exempt partnership because the for-profit partner must submit to the
nonprofit's control and charitable endeavors. To a certain degree, the forprofit partner occupies the same status as a limited partner, for whom the risk
avoidance and compensation methods are most often utilized. On the other
hand, there is greater opportunity for tax avoidance when one partner is
exempt from taxes. Tax exemption makes that partner indifferent to special
allocations of income or loss.83 A taxable partner can only accommodate

loss. Id. The "value equals basis" presumption means even if a partnership agreement contains a chargeback provision allocating gain from depreciated property to the partner to whom depreciation deductions
were previously allocated, the "strong likelihood" test cannot be met because the partners must assume that
sale of the property will result in neither gain nor loss. Id. This presumption, more than the others, allows
for clear tax avoidance. The example in the text's next paragraph demonstrates this point.
81. The value equals basis presumption prevents there from being a "strong likelihood" that the
relative value of B's partnership interests will not vary from what it would have been in the absence of the
special allocation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-I(b)(2)(5), Example l(ix) (as amended in 2004).
82. See Orrisch v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 395, 402 n.5 (1970) (approving a special allocation in
recognition of the partners' differing types of capital contributions).
83. As a final example, a tax exempt partner may be unconcerned that income in any one year is
disproportionately allocated to it because the allocation will not be taxed. Thus, a for-profit partner that
seeks to defer tax could specially allocate all income in year one to the nonprofit partner and then reverse
the allocation of income in a subsequent year. If the offsetting allocation is made more than five years from
the initial allocation, the for-profit partner will be presumed innocent. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5),
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another taxable partner if she has sufficient outside losses or a peculiar tax
status that renders the allocation inconsequential." The greater opportunity
for tax avoidance occasioned by a tax exempt partner may therefore require
greater vigilance with respect to allocations than is presently required for
normal partnerships.
V.

SPECIAL ALLOCATIONS, PREFERENTIAL DISTRIBUTIONS AND TAX
EXEMPTION

In most specific instances, it is not very difficult to determine whether an
entity is entitled to charitable tax exemption. As an overall theoretical matter,
though, it is difficult to articulate a universal definition of "charity" deserving
of tax exemption.8 5 Still, there are a few precisely stated doctrinal requirements.86 The first requirement is that an entity must be organized and
operated primarily for charitable purposes.87 This requirement is sometimes
referred to as the "exclusively operated" requirement.88 The second requirement is known as the prohibition against private inurement.89 That prohibition
states that a charitable entity may not distribute net earnings to "insiders."'
Insiders are broadly defined to include directors, officers, and persons having
ownership type authority with regard to the charitable organization.9 The
third and least understood requirement is that a charitable entity cannot
operate for private benefit.9 2 That doctrine essentially requires that the
benefits of tax exemption must be broadly dispersed amongst charitable
beneficiaries rather than a select group of noncharitable beneficiaries.93 The
unnecessary conveyance of an economic benefit constitutes private benefit.
The fourth requirement, one that is only slightly more understandable than the

(as amended in 2004).
Example 8(ii)
84. See Rev. Rul. 99-43, 1999-2 C.B. 506 (one partner was insolvent and therefore not taxable on
income from the discharge of indebtedness specially allocated to him).
85. See Darryll K. Jones, When Charity Aids Tax Shelters, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 769, 803-06 (2001)
(discussing the elusiveness that characterizes the meaning of "charity" and citing to previous articles
attempting to define the term).
86. The specific requirements are either explicitly stated in or extrapolated from I.R.C. § 501(c)
(2004).
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(I) (as amended in 1990).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(2) (as amended in 1990).
89. For an in-depth study of the private inurement prohibition, see Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla
of Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575 (2000).
90. Id. at 578 (citing United Cancer Council v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999)).
91. For an in-depth study of the private benefit doctrine, see Darryll K. Jones, Private Benefit and
the Unanswered Questions From Redlands, 89 TAX NOTES 121 (2000).
92. Id.
93. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (declaring private university undeserving
of tax exemption because its racially discriminatory policies conflict clearly defined public policy).
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private benefit prohibition, is that a charity must not operate in a manner that
is inconsistent with clearly defined public policy.94 That is, a charity should
not cause more societal problems than it solves. These four doctrinal requirements form the legal meaning of "charity" deserving of tax exemption.
This section analyzes whether any of the risk avoidance and compensation methods identified above necessarily violate the doctrinal requirements
applicable to tax exempt organizations. The query is prompted by unexplained statements in the two revenue rulings regarding the factors that do not
jeopardize a nonprofit partner's tax exemption. Both rulings seem to exclude
special allocations though neither ruling, nor any of the cases, provide analytical justification for that possibility.95 Plumstead and subsequent administrative opinions imply that the nonprofit partner may not use its assets to
shield a for-profit partner from the joint venture activity's inherent risk of
loss.9 6 On the other hand, the cases and rulings implicitly accept the notion
that a for-profit partner may pursue reasonable profit via the partnership, and
that the nonprofit partner must necessarily comply with the rules applicable
in the marketplace. 97 Marketplace rules dictate that partners will structure
their agreement based on their economic needs and preferences. In joint
ventures, one partner may use special allocations or preferential distributions
to compensate or indemnify another partner assuming otherwise unacceptable
risks. Thus, there are inconsistent implications in the rulings approving taxable-tax exempt joint ventures.
The prohibition against private inurement essentially prohibits a nonprofit organization from overpaying insiders for goods and services.98 The
prohibition is most often implicated when a nonprofit makes payments for
services provided by insiders. It also logically applies to loans made to the
organization by an insider because a loan is essentially the rental of capital.
The prohibition is therefore applicable to guaranteed payments since the

94. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
96. Id.
97. Jones, supra note 90, at 595-610 (discussing the history and case law of "strict accounting
private inurement").
98. In a whole charity joint venture, all partners clearly stand in a position analogous to "owners"
with respect to the nonprofit organization. Cf supra note 88 (defining "insiders" as persons exercising
ownership authority over a tax exempt organization). Perhaps an argument could be made that a for-profit
partner in a whole charity joint venture should not be deemed an insider because by definition the for-profit
partner cannot have the control necessary to be viewed as an owner for purposes of the private inurement
prohibition. See United Cancer Council v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that the
ultimate test of insider status is the authority to control the tax exempt organization). The control
requirement for insider status, however, seems to be an additional gloss on the regulatory definition which
labels an insider any person with a "personal and private interest in the activities of the organization."
Treas. Reg. 1.501(a)-I(c) (as amended in 1982).
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essence of guaranteed payments is that a recipient partner is acting like an
insider selling services or renting capital to the nonprofit organization.99
Recall too that a guaranteed payment is economically identical to one partner
transferring capital to another in exchange for goods or services. In a twoentity taxable-tax exempt joint venture, a guaranteed payment is therefore
precisely analogous to a nonprofit partner transferring capital to an insider for
goods or services. Thus, even though the effects of guaranteed payments may
emulate the effects of special allocations, the propriety of guaranteed payments should be judged, in the first instance, by reference to the prohibition
against private inurement. Under this approach, a guaranteed payment to a
for-profit partner should jeopardize the nonprofit partner's tax exemption only
if the purchase of goods or services from a non-partner insider for the same
price would result in private inurement. The proper inquiry is whether the
nonprofit partner is transferring profit to the for-profit partner.'°° The analysis
focuses solely on whether the guaranteed payment is reasonable by market
standards and does not require a blanket prohibition such as might be
suggested in the rulings.
Preferred returns are not as easily reconciled with the doctrines applicable to tax exemption. The prohibition against private inurement should apply
just as it should apply with respect to guaranteed payment. For example, a
preferred return could be structured so that the economic effect is that the nonprofit partner transfers an unreasonable amount of capital to the for-profit recipient partner. In that case, a preferred return would violate a doctrinal requirement for tax exemption.
An additional focus should be on the private benefit doctrine because
preferred returns might be viewed as a special and unnecessary benefit accruing to a select, noncharitable beneficiary. The analysis should begin with the
recognition that the for-profit partner logically undertakes greater risk than
does the nonprofit partner. Under normal marketplace rules, the charitable
partner would be obliged to compensate a market participant for her assumption of greater risk. The for-profit is legitimately pursuing profit and is
entitled to the same rate of return that would be available in the normal
marketplace. The nonprofit is not exempt, by virtue of its good status, from
paying market rate for capital. Thus, the nonprofit must offer competitive
returns to induce for-profit partners to invest in a charitable joint venture. The
for-profit's receipt of a reasonable return is therefore entirely consistent with
99. Recall that a guaranteed payment is deductible, if at all, only to the extent it represents a
reasonable payment for goods and services. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1 (c) (as amended in 1958). Moreover, an
unreasonable salary paid to an owner is presumptively viewed as a disguised distribution of profit. Treas.
Reg. 1.162-7(b)(1) (1958).
100. Rev. Rul. 2004-51, though, implies that the sole consequence would be that the income from
the ancillary joint venture would be subject to UB1T.

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

tax exemption, though that fact was actually confirmed by Plumstead. A
preferred return should not be viewed as conveying a private benefit to the
extent the payment would be necessary outside the context of a joint venture.
The preference inherent in preferred returns complicates the analysis
because the for-profit's entitlement may result in the subordination, rather
than furtherance, of the charitable goal. Doctrinally, a for-profit partner's
entitlement to reasonable returns may legitimately take precedence over all
other partnership goals except the accomplishment of the charitable goal. An
arrangement that conflicts with this statement should be considered inconsistent with tax exemption. For example, the need to apply surplus funds to
charitable operations may suffer because of an unalterable obligation to make
a preferred return. That result would be inconsistent with the imperative that
charity must take precedence over profit, even reasonable profit, if the nonprofit partner is to retain tax exemption. Sacrificing the charitable goal would
suggest that the nonprofit is operated for the profit-making partner's private
benefit. The ultimate resolution is probably one that must depend on peculiar
facts and circumstances of each joint venture rather than a bright line rule. If
the agreement mandates annual distribution of net income with a preference
to the for-profit partner, the charitable goal must necessarily suffer if preferred
returns are made to the for-profit partner at a time when retained income is
necessary to achieve the charitable goal. The requirement to make annual
distributions of surplus earnings would necessarily limit the discretion that
seems inherent in real control such as that demanded by the control mandate.
If distributions are discretionary, though subject to a preference when and if
authorized, a preferred return would not necessarily conflict with the requirement that the charitable goal preempt profit-making. This is particularly true
with regard to whole charity joint ventures since the nonprofit partner must
have voting control of the governing board and can determine when distributions are to be made. In an ancillary joint venture, a nondiscretionary preferred return should likewise be viewed as inconsistent with the requirement that
charity take precedence over profit-making since the for-profit's return would
have to be made prior to any charitable reinvestment of surplus earnings."'
Preferred returns, then, are potentially though not necessarily inconsistent
with a charitable tax exemption and like guaranteed payments need not be
subject to a blanket prohibition.
Perhaps the most troublesome issue relates to special allocations. Special
allocations raise concerns in the first instance for the same reason as preferential distributions. If distributions are consistent with allocations, as often they
are, a disproportionately large allocation of income to a for-profit partner will
have a similar effect as a nondiscretionary preferred return. The charitable

101. See generally Jones, supra note 85.
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goal might suffer as a result of the larger distribution of income to the forprofit partner, particularly if the for-profit partner has no inclination or
obligation to reinvest the distribution in the partnership. Thus, special allocations might be viewed as invariably inconsistent with the requirement that
charitable goals must predominate.
An even more difficult issue relates to the purposeful use of special
allocations for tax avoidance purposes. Loss and depreciation deductions, for
example, are useless to a tax exempt partner because the organization pays no
taxes. A tax exempt partner is therefore indifferent to the allocation of partnership items. In normal partnerships, one partner will be indifferent only if
that partner has outside tax attributes that otherwise eliminate the partner's tax
liabilities. A tax exempt partner is not dependent on other losses and deductions, so the opportunity for tax avoidance is heightened in taxable-tax exempt
partnerships. If it is assumed that special allocations do not cause the subordination of charitable goals, should special allocations nevertheless be treated
as inconsistent with tax exemption if those special allocations assist in the forprofit's tax avoidance plans?
I argue in another article that a nonprofit's intentional lending of its tax
exemption for the purpose of tax avoidance should result in the revocation of
the nonprofit's tax exemption. " The assertion is based on the notion that the
private benefit doctrine forbids a nonprofit from unnecessarily conveying a
financial advantage on a profit-maker. Doing so results in a waste of public
assets; nonprofit organizations constitute public trusts. The lending of a nonprofit's tax exemption asset to a for-profit for tax avoidance purposes-for
example, when a nonprofit accepts a disproportionate allocation of income to
delay or prevent the taxation of that income to the for-profit partner-can
never be necessary because the nonprofit receives no charitable benefit from
the transaction. 0 3 A second asserted justification for denying tax exemption
when nonprofits engage in tax avoidance is that the nonprofit is acting in a
manner contrary to clearly established public policy. Illegitimate tax avoidance is clearly contrary to public policy, though it is difficult to distinguish
illegitimate tax avoidance from legitimate tax planning. Tax exempt organizations are, in sense, entrusted by the tax code with a special fiduciary responsibility to decrease the burdens of government. Tax exempt organizations are
manifestly undeserving of tax exemption when instead they increase those
burdens by assisting a taxable entity in stealing from the public fisc by way of

102. Darryll K. Jones, When Charity Aids Tax Shelters, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 769 (2001).
103. The sole benefit to the nonprofit organization is the receipt of a fee, disguised or explicit. The
pursuit of money, by itself, does not convey a charitable benefit sufficient to warrant tax exemption even
if the money is subsequently devoted to charitable activities. I.R.C. § 502 (2004).
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illegitimate tax avoidance. Hence, the use of special allocations for tax avoidance purposes is inconsistent with tax exemption.
The problem with these arguments in the present context is that the tax
avoidance made possible by special allocations is neither illegitimate nor
inconsistent with clearly established public policy. To the contrary, I.R.C.
§ 704(b) explicitly condones a certain degree of tax avoidance. Thus, a nonprofit might agree to a special allocation motivated by tax avoidance and yet
remain perfectly within the law's explicit allowance. Though it can hardly be
said that compliance with the law's allowance contravenes public policy, it
might still be argued that a nonprofit entity should not engage in tax avoidance
even if that avoidance is otherwise condoned. The law so implies in I.R.C. §
514(c)(9)(E), a statute that places limits on special allocations in debtfinanced partnerships with tax exempt partners. Those special restrictions are
deemed necessary because a tax exempt partner presents special opportunities
for tax avoidance. 1" I.R.C. § 514(c)(9)(E) might be viewed, though, as
evidence that Congress condones nonprofits' participation in special allocation in circumstances the statute does not cover. This seems especially true
since there are no special prohibitions pertaining to nonprofit organizations
anywhere else in the Code. These conflicting observations fairly eliminate
reliance on grand theory to preclude the use of special allocations in taxabletax exempt organizations because the theory supports multiple results.
VI. CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion leads to a conclusion that contradicts the
implication in Revenue Rulings 98-15 and 2004-51. There is no invariable
inconsistency between special allocations, preferential distributions, and tax
exemption. The potential inconsistencies between tax exemption and special
allocations and preferential distributions should be addressed as they materialize, not by a prospective rule that entirely prevents partners from using
available risk compensation and avoidance methods when economic circumstances dictate. A rule that appropriately indicates that risk compensation and
avoidance methods should not result in the subordination of charitable goals
to profit-making, along with informative examples, would be sufficient. To
completely preclude taxable-tax exempt partnerships from access to those risk
compensation methods would ignore two facts upon which taxable-tax exempt
joint ventures have been legitimized. First, nonprofit organizations must exist
and function within a larger capitalist economy that operates on the basis of
profit-seeking; all participants must render fair market value for goods and

104. In addition, the presence of debt multiplies the harm because partners get a higher basis for
borrowed money that might never be repaid.
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services. Second, for-profit organizations need not become charitable merely
because they engage in transactions with nonprofit organizations. They
should not be allowed to exploit tax exemption, but for-profit organizations
may legitimately seek reasonable returns, assisted by normal risk avoidance
and compensation methods, even in their dealings with nonprofit organizations.

